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Abstract
Frege claims that the laws of logic are characterized by their “generality,” but it is
hard to see how this could identify a special feature of those laws. I argue that we
must understand this talk of generality in normative terms, but that what Frege says
provides a normative demarcation of the logical laws only once we connect it with
his thinking about truth and science. He means to be identifying the laws of logic
as those that appear in every one of the scientic systems whose construction is the
ultimate aim of science, and in which all truths have a place. Though an account of
logic in terms of scientic systems might seem hopelessly antiquated, I argue that it
is not: a basically Fregean account of the nature of logic still looks quite promising.
1 A Normative Science
Does logic study how thinkers ought to think, or how they do, in fact, think? Is it the
“ethics” or the “physics” of thinking? These were the terms in which the nature of logic
was being disputed when Frege came to formulate his own mature views about it.1 He
arms that “like ethics, logic can also be called a normative science,” (Frege 1897a, 128)
and diagnoses a confusion that leads people to mistakenly take up the opposing posi-
tion. It is “commonly granted that the logical laws are guidelines which thought should
follow” but “it is only too easily forgotten,” (Frege 1893, xv) because, though we correctly
“dene the task of logic as the investigation of the laws of thought,” (Frege 1879-1891,
4) we become confused by “the ambiguity of the word ‘law’...In one sense [a law] says
what is; in the other it prescribes what ought to be” (Frege 1893, xv). By applying the
1For a discussion of the state of the debate at the time, see Chapter 1 of Carl 1994.
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wrong sense in the claim that logic investigates the laws of thought, we wrongly con-
clude that logic studies “laws in accordance with which thinking actually takes place”
(Frege 1879-1891, 4).
Frege thinks that what makes the error particularly hard to avoid is that the laws
of logic are actually laws in both senses: they both assert what is and prescribe what
ought to be. As statements of what is, however, they have no special relationship to
thought: they tell us, for example, that everything is self-identical. But by stating what
is, they also tell us how we ought to think, because “any law asserting what is, can be
conceived as prescribing that one ought to think in conformity with it, and is thus in
that sense a law of thought.” This way of being a law of thought, Frege notices, “holds
for geometrical and physical laws no less than for the logical” (Frege 1893, xv).
But if every law is a law of thought, then Frege cannot dene the task of logic as the
investigation of the laws of thought. He holds onto something close to that denition by
claiming that the laws of logic are those with a special claim to being laws of thought,
because “they are the most general laws, prescribing how to think wherever there is
thinking at all” (Frege 1893, xv). Hence, “the task we assign logic is only that of saying
what holds with the utmost generality for all thinking, whatever its subject matter.”
(Frege 1897a, 128). The laws of logic are distinctive laws of thought, because they are
the most general.
What exactly does this “generality” amount to? One might assume that he is saying
that the logical laws tell us about everything there is: they are universal generalizations.
But that kind of generality is not special. On Frege’s analysis, a law like “All whales are
mammals” is a universal generalization, saying that every object is such that if it is a
whale, it is a mammal. One might point out that the laws of other sciences are often, in a
sense, “restricted” by their conditional form: the above law is in this sense “restricted to
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whales.” But many of Frege’s logical laws have this conditional form too. (For example,
Basic Law I says something like “For all objects x and y, if x is the True then if y is the True
then x is the True.”) One might point out that many logical laws involve higher-order
generality as well as rst-order generality: they tell us about all concepts (or properties)
as well as all objects. But not all logical laws involve second-order generality. (Again,
Basic Law I does not.)2 What Frege is saying, then, is not about the appearance of the
concept of generality in the laws. So what is he saying?
As I will argue, we do not yet have an adequate answer to this question. This strikes
me as a scandal. Until we know what Frege thinks logical truths are, we do not know
how Frege understood the central claim of his work, that arithmetical truths are logical
truths. Nor can we understand what he took himself to be doing when he put forward
the logical system whose essentials we still teach every undergraduate philosophy major
today. This is why it matters what, on his mature view, Frege thinks logic is, and most
of this paper is dedicated to answering that question. In the nal section, I will discuss
why it matters what logic really is, and argue that though accounts in the spirit of Frege’s
view are currently neglected, we should take them seriously.
Since it is his mature views that concern us, and since there is a real possibility that
he changed his mind over time, we will focus, at least at rst, only on the key passages
in his Basic Laws of Arithmetic and other work from around the same time.3 Once we
have in this way arrived at basic constraints that any interpretation must satisfy, we can
bring in what he says elsewhere, when doing so helps to ll out an interpretation that
2Macbeth 2005 (103-108) argues that the logicality of Basic Law I and the other laws that lack second-
level generality depends on the fact that it “can be construed” so that it involves multiple levels of gener-
ality. But any law can be “construed,” along the lines she suggests, and she oers no reason to think Frege
attaches any importance to the possibility of reconstruals of his logical laws.
3To arrive at the two criteria of adequacy mentioned in section 5, I rely only on Frege’s work from
1893 and 1897, and very occasionally on a paper that may have been written in 1891. See Linnebo 2003,
Mezzadri 2018, and the discussion in section 5 below for reasons to think that Frege changes his mind
about central aspects of logic.
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satises those constraints.
2 Generality: The Required Vocabulary Interpretation
Frege thinks that “logic...has its own concepts and relations...To logic, for example, there
belong the following: negation, identity, subsumption, subordination of concepts...” (Frege
1906b, 338). Thomas Ricketts has suggested that the generality of the logical laws is
inherited from special features of the vocabulary that refers to these concepts and rela-
tions: “logical laws are maximally general in that the only vocabulary required for their
expression is the topic-universal vocabulary required for statements on any topic what-
soever” (Ricketts 1996, 123).4 We can call this the Required Vocabulary Interpretation of
generality.
It seems clear that no special feature of the vocabulary used to express the logical
laws can really distinguish the logical laws from those of the other sciences, since obvi-
ously non-logical truths can be stated using only that same vocabulary: for example, the
truth that there exist ve non-logical objects.5 Ricketts recognizes this, and his conclu-
sion is that talk of “generality” is not intended to provide any real demarcation of logical
laws.6 Ultimately, then, Ricketts thinks that “Frege has only a retail conception of logic,
not a wholesale one. He tells us what logic is by identifying specic laws and inferences
as logical...[he] does not state a dening criterion of the logical” (Ricketts 1996, 124). In
particular, “generality” is not such a criterion.
4In earlier work, Ricketts seems to have missed the fact that logic has its own concepts and objects,
claiming that “the laws of logic do not mention this or that thing.” (Ricketts 1985, 4.) Sometimes he seems
to express a slightly weaker characterization of these concepts: they “appear in thought and discourse on
every subject matter whatever.” (Ricketts 1997, 138.)
5i.e., objects that are not value-ranges, truth-values, etc. This kind of example appears in Heck 2012,
35-36.
6Like the rest of the notions that Frege uses to describe what logic is, Ricketts thinks this one is “irre-
mediably fuzzy.” (Ricketts 1997, 151.)
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The claim that Frege did not successfully distinguish the laws of logic from the oth-
ers is very widely accepted, and by a range of commentators who disagree about central
aspects of Frege interpretation, including Warren Goldfarb,7 Patricia Blanchette,8 Jamie
Tappenden,9 and Richard Kimberly Heck.10 Some of these authors think Frege was ac-
tively seeking a distinguishing feature that he had not yet found, while others think he
had principled reasons for thinking a genuine demarcation impossible,11 but they agree
that what he says about “generality” is not sucient, and that he knew it.
This agreement is premature. Frege never acknowledges that some non-logical truths
have the same generality as logical laws, and before invoking the generality that gives
the laws of logic a special claim to the name “laws of thought,” he emphasizes that “how
the logical laws are conceived” will be “decisive for the treatment of this science,” and
that we must have the right conception of them if we are to prevent “the ruinous incur-
sion of psychology into logic” (Frege 1893, xiv). This gives the strong impression that
he at least thought that he was providing us with a distinguishing feature of the logical
laws, which will allow us to conceive of them in such a way that we can, for example,
see that psychology will be wholly irrelevant to them.12 This means that we should look
7“Frege’s conception of logic is retail, not wholesale. He simply presents various laws of logic and
logical inference rules, and then demonstrates other logical laws on the basis of these. He frames no
overarching characteristic that demarcates the logical laws from others.” (Goldfarb 2001, 30.)
8“He gives no general characterization of the principles or truths of logic. He simply exhibits a small
handful of what he takes to be self-evidently logical truths and inference-rules...” (Blanchette 2012, 147.)
9“It is true that nowhere does Frege give a criterion of the logical, although this could simply reect
that he had not arrived at one.” (Tappenden 1997, 213.)
10Frege “was struggling with...questions about the nature of logic...he was developing a conception of
logic in which [semantic notions] would play a fundamental role,” but never arrived at a settled view.
(Heck 2012, 38.)
11Goldfarb, for example, thinks that Frege’s principled commitment not to do “semantic” theorizing
would rule out a substantive criterion of the logical. (See, e.g., Goldfarb 2001.) But such commitments
would at most rule out particular kinds of demarcation for logic, like those involving a substantive use of
a truth-predicate applied to sentences.
12Goldfarb tries to dissolve this tension by quoting Frege’s claim that he has provided only a “rough
indication of the goal of logic.” (Goldfarb 2001, 31.) This sounds to Goldfarb like an admission that what
he has said about generality is not really a way of demarcating the logical laws. But the “roughness”
claim appears only in the unpublished discussion of generality, while the more complete discussion in
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carefully for an understanding of “generality” according to which, given the rest of what
Frege thinks, it at least plausibly distinguishes the logical laws from the others—unless,
of course, the evidence for an interpretation that does not, like the Required Vocabulary
Interpretation, is overwhelming.
For that interpretation, however, the evidence is thin. The mere fact that logic has its
own vocabulary does not motivate interpreting the generality of its laws by reference
to that vocabulary. The passages in which Frege claims that the logical laws are special
because of their generality makes no mention at all of the vocabulary of logic, nor of the
concepts and objects to which that vocabulary refers. I suggest that this interpretation
results from blending what Frege himself says with someone else’s ideas—it is Quine
who endorses the “widely applicable method of demarcating a branch of science...the
method of listing the vocabulary,” so that for Quine, “The logical truths...are the truths
in which only the logical...vocabulary occurs essentially” (Quine 1986, 399).13 Since there
is no good textual reason to think Frege had this in mind with his talk of generality, we
should not accept the Required Vocabulary Interpretation.
3 Generality: The Normative Interpretation
We have seen Frege claim that the task of logic is “that of saying what holds with the
utmost generality for all thinking, whatever its subject matter.” But if logic’s generality
has to do with “all thinking,” it must have to do with the laws in their prescriptive aspect,
Frege 1893 contains no such claim. Moreover, what Frege strictly says in the unpublished discussion
is that he is trying to “roughly make the goal recognizable.” [“ungefähr das Ziel kenntlich...machen.”]
Frege emphasizes that any “roughness,” derives from “the author’s inadequacy and the awkwardness of
language” rather than from the absence of something sharp that distinguishes the logical laws from the
others.
13We see this Quinean source when the claim is put in terms of “vocabulary” rather than in terms of the
special concepts and objects that Frege himself claims logic has. The fact that the logical vocabulary can
be used to state apparently non-logical truths is sometimes raised as a problem for Quine: e.g., footnote
35 of Parsons 1986.
6
because it is only in that aspect that these laws are especially concerned with thinking
at all. In the same way, the other central claim that mentions generality explains it in
terms of a universal prescription for thinking: “they are the most general laws, prescrib-
ing how to think wherever there is thinking at all.” This observation leads us to the
Normative Interpretation of generality: as John MacFarlane puts it, “the kind of general-
ity that distinguishes logic...is a generality in the applicability of the norms it provides”
(MacFarlane 2002, 37). All thinking ought to be in conformity with these laws, and that
is what is distinctive of them.
Frege’s own discussions of generality clearly point us in this direction, and this in-
terpretation has been gaining adherents recently. But there is something odd about the
way it is usually endorsed. Commentators tend to state the Normative Interpretation, but
then immediately make additions to the basic claim that these laws are special because
they prescribe for all thinking. For example, they add that the logical laws are general in
that it is constitutive of thinking that it ought to proceed in conformity with the laws of
logic,14 which adds the metaphysical claim that what makes the activity of thinking what
it is is that these laws prescribe for it. One author adds that Frege’s notion of generality
has “an even more profound dimension: to count as a thinker at all one must acknowl-
edge the categorical normative authority that logic has” (Taschek 2008, 384).15 Neither
addition is implied by Frege’s basic claim that the laws of logic are special because they
tell us “what holds with the utmost generality for all thinking, whatever its subject mat-
ter.” Perhaps Frege accepts these additional claims, and perhaps not—but either way,
why do commentators build them into his talk of generality?
14Some of MacFarlane’s own statements express this additional constitutive element: “Logic is general
in the sense that it provides constitutive norms for thought as such, regardless of its subject matter.”
(MacFarlane 2002, 37.) See also Taschek 2008, 383: “what is distinctive about logical laws...is...that in an
important sense they issue in, while the laws of physics do not, constitutive norms of thinking as such.”
15This idea is also tentatively endorsed in Steinberger 2017, 152.
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We will nd an answer to this question in a moment. For now, let us stick with the
basic Normative Interpretation of generality. It identies a distinctive feature of logical
laws only if we ought to think in conformity with the logical laws in all of our thinking,
whereas for every non-logical law, there is some thinking that is permitted not to be in
conformity with it. Whether or not that is so depends on what these prescriptions are:
on what exactly Frege means by “thinking,” and “conformity.”
Though Frege sometimes identies thinking with “the grasp of a thought,” (e.g.: Frege
1918-1919a, 355) MacFarlane thinks we should “take Frege’s talk of norms for thinking
as talk of norms for judging.” I agree, for three reasons.16
1. Frege tells us to read it this way. He oers (in passing) a correction to his tendency
to talk about these laws as applying to “thinking” and “thought”: “if we call them
laws of thought, or, better, laws of judgement...” (Frege 1897a, 145; my italics).17
What he is saying would be better put using the word “judgement.”
2. In the relevant sections, Frege identies “the goal” of thinking as truth (See Frege
1897a, 128). But it is only judging—“the acknowledgement of the truth of a thought”—
that has truth as its goal (Frege 1918-1919a, 356).18 So “thinking” here must be
judging.
3. In these sections, Frege freely switches between “think” and “judge”. For example,
while the claims about generality are in terms of “all thinking,” he switches to
talk of “prescriptions for making judgements,” and “prescriptions to which our
judgements must conform...if they are to remain in agreement with the truth”
(Frege 1897a, 145). This lack of any marked distinction between “thinking” and
“judging,” suggests that they refer to the same thing.
By “thinking” in conformity with a law, then, Frege probably means “judging” in con-
formity with it. (This is not to say that Frege would deny that the laws of logic issue
16The reason MacFarlane gives in favour of his reading is close to one of mine, but his formulation
depends on assumptions about “conformity” that we should keep separate.
17The original reads: “Wenn man sie also Denkgesetze oder besser Urteilsgesetze nennen will, so muss
man nicht vergessen, dass es sich dabei um Gesetze handelt, die wie die Sittengesetze oder Staatsgesetze
vorschreiben, wie gehandelt werden soll...”
18Truth is not the goal of grasping thoughts, because sometimes “knowledge of the truth is attained
precisely through our grasping a false thought” as in a proof by reductio (Frege 1918-1919b, 375). See also
Frege 1892, 34.
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prescriptions for other mental activities, too. The point is that, in the passages in which
Frege distinguishes logical laws from the others by claiming that they prescribe for all
“thinking,” he is referring only to judging. Even if these laws prescribe for other activ-
ities, we can see what is special about them by focussing on judging alone.) I will call
this interpretive suggestion “Thinking=Judging.”
It is harder to know what Frege means by “conformity.” Since Frege says that our
thinking must be in “conformity” with the logical laws if it is “not to fail of the truth,”
conformity must be a relation such that, whenever our thinking fails to bear it to logical
laws, we are not thinking something true. The obvious candidate for this relation is con-
sistency, which looks to be what MacFarlane has in mind: his examples are prescriptions
not to judge things that are, collectively, inconsistent with logical laws.19 On this inter-
pretative suggestion, which I will call “Conformity=Consistency,” to think in conformity
with a law is to think only thoughts that are not collectively inconsistent with it.
On theNormative Interpretation, supplemented with both Thinking=Judging andCon-
formity=Consistency, Frege is saying that the laws of logic are those with which every-
thing we judge ought to be collectively consistent. But there is a problem: this feature
obviously cannot distinguish the laws of logic from those of other sciences, because all
judging ought to be of what is collectively consistent with every law of every science.
The following argument shows why this is.
S) Suppose that I am judging, and L is a law of some science.
P1) All judging ought not proceed in a way that fails to reach the goal of judging.
(This is why Frege thinks that the prescriptions apply to our thinking at all. They
answer our question “How must I think in order to reach the goal, truth?” (Frege
1897a, 128).
C1) Therefore, I ought not judge in a way that fails to reach the goal of judging. (S and
P1)
19i.e.: “One ought not believe both a proposition and its negation.” (MacFarlane 2002, 36.) A perhaps
more general statement of what the prescriptions are comes later: “a thinker ought not make judgements
that are incompatible with [the laws].”
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P2) To judge things that are collectively inconsistent with L is to fail to judge only true
things. (This is because laws are truths, and what is inconsistent with a truth is
not true.)
P3) The goal of all judging is to judge only true things. (The quotes above identify
“truth” and “not to fail of the truth” as the goal.)
C2) Therefore, to judge things that are collectively inconsistent with L is to judge in a
way that fails to reach the goal of judging. (P2 and P3)
C3) Therefore, I ought not to judge things that are collectively inconsistent with L. (C1
and C2)
It looks like the Normative Interpretation cannot demarcate the logical laws after all.
This, I suggest, is why commentators do not rest for long with the Normative Inter-
pretation itself: they do not really believe that it identies a distinctive feature of the
logical laws at all. To nd a distinctive feature, they think we must go beyond Frege’s
normative claim and make a metaphysical claim about what makes thinking thinking, or
a claim about what all thinkers must acknowledge. This would give Frege the chance to
say: even though all laws prescribe for all thinking, only in the case of the logical laws is
it constitutive of all thinking that they prescribe for it—so they are special. Or the chance
to say: even though all laws prescribe for all thinking, only in the case of the logical laws
is it impossible to be a thinker while failing to acknowledge their authority—so they are
special. This is to abandon Frege’s claim that the logical laws are special because they
say “what holds with the utmost generality for all thinking, whatever its subject matter,”
and “prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think if one is to think at all.”
It is to admit that this normative feature of logical laws is not special after all.
I think this line of thought is a mistake. Frege says that the logical laws are distinctive
because they prescribe for all thinking: our clear interpretive task is to make sense of
how he can believe that.20 The key is to see that “conformity,” is not just consistency.
20Whether or not Frege accepts those other claims, then, is a side-issue, which I will not try to settle
here—but I will say what I think. Frege does not accept that it is impossible to be a thinker without
acknowledging the normative authority of the logical laws. It is central to his discussion of the so-called
“logical alien” that though we may be unable to bring ourselves to reject (or even doubt) the normative
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4 Systematic Conformity
So far, we have seen that according to Frege, it is distinctive of logical laws that all
thinking ought to be in conformity with them, and by “thinking,” he probably means
judging. But if this is to be a distinguishing feature of these laws, conformity must be
some relation such that if any judging fails to bear that relation to the logical laws, that
judging will “fail of the truth”, whereas for each law of the other sciences, there is some
judging that need not bear that relation to that law in order to “remain in agreement
with the truth.” The argument above shows that the consistency of what is judged with
the law is not such a relation. In fact, it is dicult even to think of such a relation. (Give
it a try!) But if we recall some features of the way Frege thinks about truth, this relation
comes into view.
In several places, Frege explains that when he talks about “truth,” he means only
what we might call “scientic truth.”21 He says that “in logic, we are concerned with
truth in the strictest sense of the word,” (Frege 1895, 226) which he calls “truth in the
scientic sense” (Frege 1906a, 186; Frege 1914, 232) and “that sort of truth which it is the
aim of science to discern.” (Frege 1918-1919a, 352). Though it is not immediately clear
what the point of these clarications are, they ultimately prove to express a substantive
restriction or assumption: one that allows Frege to argue that certain words cannot
be used to express truths on the grounds that they “are illegitimate in science,” (Frege
authority of a law of logic, this “hinders us not at all in supposing beings who do reject it.” (Frege 1983,
Introduction.) To “reject” a law or its normative authority requires thinking, so such beings would be
thinkers who reject the authority of the logical laws. (The only way to escape this point is to endorse the
heroic attempt in Conant 1991 to read Frege as ultimately forced to retract many of the claims he makes in
his discussion of the logical alien, as “a ladder which one climbs up and then throws away.”) On the other
hand, I think that Frege does accept that it is constitutive of thinking that it ought to be consistent with
the laws of logic, but that this is not distinctive of them; it is also constitutive of thinking that it ought to
be consistent with the laws of physics. What is constitutive of thinking is just to have truth as its goal,
and both sets of laws are true.
21For an illuminating discussion of some aspects of scientic truth in Frege, see Weiner 1996.
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1895, 228)22 or are unsuitable “for conducting proofs” (Frege 1896, 115).23 Frege seems to
assume that only what is suitable to gure in science—proof-based science—can be true.
These are not the only places in which Frege makes this assumption. Consider his
well-known claim that to locate a truth in the analytic/synthetic, a priori/empirical di-
chotomy, we must “nd the proof and follow it back to the primitive truths” (Frege 1884,
§3). He is assuming that, with the exception of primitive truths, every truth has a proof.
He makes that same assumption when he supposes that certain truths about numbers
might be “unprovable” and immediately concludes that in that case they would all be
“primitive truths” (Frege 1884, §5). This would be trivial if there were no more to being
a “primitive truth” than being a truth with no proof. But Frege introduces the notion of
a primitive truth in connection with his ocial account of proof: to be a primitive truth
is to be an ultimate premise in scientic proofs.24 He depends on this fact in arguments.
For example, he denies that there can be innitely many primitive truths, on the grounds
that there is a “need of reason” that the “foundations” of a science—the ultimate premises
of its proofs—be “surveyable” (Frege 1884, §5). To assume that all truths are provable or
primitive, then, is to assume that all truths have a place in a scientic system of proof,
22In the relevant passage, these are Frege’s grounds for denying that ctional names can be used to
express truths, in spite of the common-sense claims that lead to the philosophical discussion of truth in
ction. He reminds us that we are “concerned with truth in the strictest sense of the word.”
23In the relevant passage, Frege denies that sentences involving vague terms can be true, on the grounds
that reasoning with such terms leads to sorites-style problems: “the fallacy known by the name of ‘Ac-
ervus’.” In response to the common-sense objection that “such words are used thousands of times in the
language of life,” apparently to say true things, Frege replies, “Yes; but our vernacular languages are also
not made for conducting proofs.”
24As de Jong 1996 (300) comments on the dichotomy of truths above: “Frege places and presents these
distinctions from the outset within the framework of the aristotelian [i.e. proof-system-based] model of
science. Without this model, what Frege says about these distinctions is nearly incomprehensible.” Frege
1914, 204-205 introduces primitive truths as follows: “If we start from a theorem and trace the chains
of inference backwards until we arrive at other theorems or at axioms, postulates, or denitions, we
discover chains of inference...terminating with the theorem in question. The totality of these inference-
chains constitutes the proof of the theorem...Science demands that...we do not rest until we come up
against something unprovable...If we assume that we have succeeded in discovering these primitive truths,
and that [the science] has been developed from them, then it will appear as a system of truths that are
connected with each other by logical inference.”
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whether as theorem or as ultimate premise.
Such systems are of the rst importance for Frege: he announces, for example, that
“science only comes to fruition in a system,” so that “we shall never be able to do without
systems” (Frege 1914, 242).25 The reason these systems are so important to Frege is that
he thinks it is only by discovering them that we achieve our central cognitive goals: to
grasp the nature or essence of the subject in question,26 to have command or mastery
over its domain, and to understand and explain its phenomena.27 That is why he thinks
that the ultimate aim of our scientic activity must be to have such systems, and it is
why he spends so much eort policing the boundaries between sciences:28 if we wrongly
include a certain truth in the system of a certain science, we cannot correctly grasp the
“nature” of the subject. In holding the systematic view of the aim of science, Frege is in
agreement with most thinkers of his day.29
Frege’s exclusive concern with a “sort of truth” that gures in science so conceived is
also shared with others belonging to the dominant philosophical trend at the time. Kant
saw an essential connection between the understanding’s goal of truth and reason’s goal
25In general, see especially Frege 1884 (§3), Frege 1880-1881, and Frege 1914 for Frege’s commitment to
the systematic conception of science.
26It is the primitive truths of the systems that give us this grasp: “The essence of mathematics has to
be dened by this kernel of truths, and until we have learnt what these primitive truths are, we cannot be
clear about the nature of mathematics.” (Frege 1914, 204-205.)
27Our command over a domain is inversely proportional to the number of primitive truths in the sys-
tem: a “greater command of the material” results when we assemble the “large mass of detail under a more
comprehensive point of view,” so that “The fewer the number of primitive sentences, the more perfect a
mastery can we have.” (Frege 1880-1881, 39.) Frege further identies this mastery with possessing an ex-
planation, because the “essence of explanation lies precisely in the fact that a wide, possibly unsurveyable,
manifold is governed by one or a few sentences.” (Frege 1880-1881, 36.) Incidentally, Friedman 1974 would
introduce this idea into contemporary philosophy of science as the “unication theory of explanation,”
though he seems to be unaware that Frege is a predecessor: “the only writer that I am aware of who has
suggested that this [unication]...is the essence of explanation...is William Kneale.” (15)
28For examples of such policing, see Frege 1879-1891, 5 and Frege 1914, 203: logic does not include
psychological truths, physics does not include chemical truths, physics does include geometrical truths,
jurisprudence does include both historical and psychological truths, and so on.
29See de Jong and Betti 2010 for discussion of the prevalence of this view of science.
13
of systematic science,30 and the major gures of the dominant Neo-Kantian movement of
Frege’s day made much of this point. Hermann Cohen, for example, takes Kant to have
shown that the philosopher’s concerns are “not about cognition as such...but rather,
mathematical-scientic cognition,” whose goal, accordingly, is mathematical-scientic
truth (Cohen 1885, 56).31
When Frege says that the goal of judging is truth, then, he means that the goal is to
judge something that has a place in some scientic system of proof. On this view, the
status of a truth as such depends on the relationship that it bears to the other laws in
a scientic system. Suppose, for example, that I judge that all whales are mammals: a
truth that has a place in the proof-system of zoology, but not that of geology, or (let us
suppose) any other science. This law’s status as a truth, then, depends on its place in the
scientic system of zoology: on the relationship it bears in the proof-structure of that
system to the other laws of that science. By contrast, it has no important relationship
to, say, the geological law of superposition.
This points us to a relation with the features that we need to make sense of Frege’s
talk of “conformity”: a relation which our judging sometimes must bear to laws in order
to be true, which is stronger than mere consistency. I suggest that to judge in conformity
with a particular law is to judge something that only has a place in a scientic system that
30As Abela 2006 puts it, the fact that “lacking the top-down component of rational [i.e. systematic]
unity, the understanding has no employment...puts the demands of systematicity near the center of Kant’s
account of cognition.” (421) This reading is motivated by Kant’s claims that “the law of reason to seek
[systematic] unity is necessary, since without it we would have...no coherent use of the understanding,”
and that reason “prepares the eld for the understanding.” (Kant 1781/1787, A651/B679. and A657-8/B685-
6)
31Cohen inuentially interprets Kant’s terminology to t with this exclusive focus: he claims that Kant
“discovered a new concept of experience,” (Cohen 1871, 3) on which “experience...must count as the total
expression of all the facts and methods of scientic cognition.” (Cohen 1885, 59.) Frege was certainly
aware of Cohen’s perspective; not only was it inescapable in the intellectual world at the time, but Frege
1885b is a review of Cohen 1883, which is “Perhaps Cohen’s most sustained and systematic attempt to
present Kantian philosophy in historical connection to mathematical natural science.” (Richardson 2006,
218.)
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includes that law. On this reading, when I judge the law that whales are mammals, I am
judging in conformity with the rest of the laws in the science of zoology—the other laws
on which this law’s status as a truth depends—but not in conformity with the geological
law of superposition. I will call this interpretive suggestion Conformity=Systematicity.
Let us see what the generality of the logical laws looks like, if we read “conformity”
this way.
5 The Systematic Generality of the Logical Laws
Frege says that the laws of logic are special because of their generality. If we under-
stand this in terms of the Normative Interpretation of generality, supplemented by Think-
ing=Judging and Conformity=Systematicity, what this amounts to is: all our judging
ought to be of what only has a place in a scientic system that includes the laws of
logic. I will call the feature that this claim attributes to the laws of logic “systematic
generality.” Given that the goal of judgement is (scientic) truth and that all truths ap-
pear in scientic systems, another way to put what is special about laws that exhibit
systematic generality is simply that they appear in every scientic system.
In evaluating other interpretations of Frege’s notion of generality above, I employed
two criteria of adequacy.
1. The problem with the Required Vocabulary Interpretationwas that we must identify
generality with a feature that, at least plausibly, distinguishes the laws Frege picks
out as logical from the laws of the other sciences, given the rest of what he thinks:
there cannot be obvious counterexamples. (We need not oer an interpretation on
which Frege is correct about what is distinctive of logical laws, or even correct that
all and only the laws he himself picks out as logical have the feature that he claims
is distinctive of logical laws. Frege could have made a mistake about either point.
But it cannot be obvious that not all the laws he sees as logical have the feature he
identies as distinctive of logical laws, or that some laws he sees as non-logical do
have that feature.)
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2. I argued against those who make textually unwarranted additions to the basicNor-
mative Interpretation that we must identify generality with a particular normative
feature: what is special about logical laws must be that they (and only they) pre-
scribe for all thinking in the relevant way.
An interpretation that can satisfy both of these criteria will be the best one we have.
I will now argue that the interpretation in terms of systematic generality does satisfy
them, and respond to an important objection to which each discussion gives rise.32
First Criterion: Do the Right Laws Exhibit Systematic Generality?
Given the rest of what Frege thinks, is it plausible that the laws he identies as logical
will appear in every scientic system, and that they are the only laws that will?
Scientic systems are systems of proofs, and Frege thinks all proofs employ logical
laws. To prove a truth belonging to some particular science, he thinks we rst prove
various logical theorems from the axioms of logic, then instantiate those theorems for
the relevant concepts and objects of the science in question, and nally use one of a few
modes of inference together with the instantiated theorems and the nonlogical primitive
truths belonging to the science to reach the desired conclusion.33 It is because every
system includes such proofs that every system includes at least some logical laws.
But must they include all logical laws? If the logical axioms are included, the rest
of the laws will appear as theorems, so the question is whether all Frege’s axioms—
32The claim that the laws of logic appear in every science is sometimes attributed to Frege. (Burge
1992, for example, notes that Frege thought that “all sciences contained logic” (301), and May 2018, that
“Frege’s conception of science is...of an axiomatic system...where the deductive base, for any given science,
[includes] the Basic Laws [of logic]...” (128)) But I know of no discussion that makes it clear that this is
what he thinks is distinctive of logical laws, or explains why the view that the laws he counts as logical
are the only ones that appear in every system is a reasonable one for him to hold, or establishes any
connection with the normative role that he claims for logic.
33See 34-35 of Goldfarb 2001 for this point and an example. There would be a potentially problematic
circularity in appealing to systematic generality to characterize logical laws if it were built into the nature
of these systems that the proofs within them have to be logical, but it is not—though Frege ultimately
argues that it is a bad idea, it is consistent with the systematic conception of science to allow non-logical
proofs, such as that from “x is a whale” directly to “x is a mammal.”
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the full proof-resources of Frege’s logical system—are needed in every system in order
to prove all the truths that properly belong to the relevant science. Whether or not
this is so depends on how wide a range of truths any proper science must include, and
what it takes to prove them. If any arbitrary set of truths, no matter how small and
homogeneous, could constitute a science, then some of the laws that Frege counts as
logical would obviously not appear in all systems. But we have seen that the boundaries
between sciences are not arbitrary: a genuine science has a nature or essence that we
grasp when we have found a system including all and only the right truths. Furthermore,
Frege’s conception of the cognitive goals that we achieve by having systems implies
that every system must include a very wide range of truths: for example, explanation
is possible only when a system includes a “wide, possibly unsurveyable, manifold” of
theorems (Frege 1880-1881, 36).34
One might have a specic worry here about Basic Law V. What need has the science
of biology for an axiom about value-ranges? But since Frege thinks Basic Law V is the
axiom needed for arithmetic, it follows from Frege’s so-called “Pythagoreanism”—the
view that arithmetic is needed in every science—that this law will be needed.35 One
might think it implausible to maintain Pythagoreanism about as broad a range of sci-
ences as Frege countenances: does even the science of jurisprudence require the resources
of scientic arithmetic? But the view that it does was standard at the time, expressed
in the most widely-read logic books. Hermann Lotze, for example, claims that all sci-
ences require laws that exhibit the kind of order that can only be expressed using the
resources of a scientic arithmetic.36 As E.E. Thomas explains regarding jurisprudence
34See the discussion of cognitive goals in section 4 above.
35See, for example, Beaney 1996 (66): “Pythagoreanism...had an epistemological dimension—that we
can have no [scientic] knowledge of anything without ascribing it a number; and this fundamental
Pythagorean belief was certainly endorsed by Frege...”
36See §265 of Lotze 1874, which was “perhaps the most widely read logic text in Germany during Frege’s
early career.” (Heis 2013, 122.)
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in particular, “Speaking of law in the judicial sphere, [Lotze] says that the aim of law is
to establish a graduation in penalties that shall correspond to a graduation in oences,
this graduation proceeding on a quantitative or mathematical basis” (Thomas 1921, 6).
What about the other direction? Will any of the laws Frege identies as non-logical
exhibit systematic generality? Since Frege thinks that some sciences, including geom-
etry, are wholly a priori, no truths that can be learned only by experience will appear
in all sciences. The laws of geometry, on the other hand, must appear in many other
systems—but not every one. Frege holds, for example, that alongside the spatial “source
of knowledge” on which the science of space depends, there is a temporal source of
knowledge which gives rise to a science of time (Frege 1924/5a, 274), and these sciences
are independent: just as truths about time do not appear in the science of space (Frege
1880, 101), so claims about space will not appear in the science of time. Moreover, since
Frege is Kantian enough to suppose that the pure intuition of space is the source of geo-
metrical knowledge (see, e.g., Frege 1874 56-7, Frege 1884 §13 and §89, and Frege 1903b,
273), he presumably thinks that there could be creatures with dierent forms of outer
sense, who would investigate only sciences which contain no truths about space.
One might have a specic worry about a truth we considered in connection with the
Required Vocabulary Interpretation: “There are at least ve non-logical objects.” If every
science involves claims about particular non-logical objects, then this clearly non-logical
truth would exhibit systematic generality.37 But Frege never claims that they do. On the
contrary, he goes out of his way to argue for a point also emphasized by Lotze: that since
laws concern concepts, they remain true even if nothing falls under the concepts (see,
e.g., Frege 1884, §47 and Lotze 1874, Book III, Chapter II).38
37May 2018 attributes to Frege the claim that every science has a “subject-matter” of its own—a “domain
of entities”, which he seems to assume to be objects given to us by the relevant “source of knowledge.”
(118, 128, footnote 8.) I cannot see any clear evidence for this attribution.
38Based on what §3 of Frege 1884 says about the proof of empirical claims, Frege probably does think
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My interpretation, then, meets our rst criterion of adequacy: it is plausible, given
the rest of what Frege thinks, that the laws he identies as logical are distinguished from
the laws of other sciences by their systematic generality.
Objection: This Precludes Understanding Frege’s Logicism
The view of logic that I attribute to Frege might seem to preclude understanding his
logicist project: his attempt to show that arithmetic is a branch of logic.39 This worry
can be expressed as the following three-part objection.
Let us suppose that Frege understood logic in the way I suggest. In that case:
1. It would be easy to show that arithmetical truths are logical: we need only observe
that every proper science must include the truths of arithmetic. But Frege himself
clearly thinks it is important to actually prove these truths from logical axioms.
2. Even if for some reason Frege wanted to actually prove the truths of arithmetic
from logical axioms, there would be no need for him to get mixed up with the
notorious Basic Law V. Frege could have simply identied Hume’s Principle or
some standard set of arithmetical axioms as axioms of logic, since their logicality
would not be in doubt. Even if he were for some reason attached to Basic Law
V, surely after he came to see that it was unacceptable, he would have calmly
swapped it out for one of these other candidates. But Frege himself does not do so,
instead responding with despair.
3. Even if for some reason Frege could not complete his logicist project without Basic
Law V, he would be unable ever to abandon logicism and seek a dierent founda-
tion for arithmetic, since he would still recognize that every proper science must
include the truths of arithmetic. His view of logic itself would imply that he is
stuck with logicism. But near the end of his life, Frege himself abandons logicism:
he claims that arithmetical truths have a geometrical source, while continuing to
deny that geometrical truths are logical (e.g., Frege 1924/1925b).
It is easiest to see why the objection fails in its second part: it assumes that the only
that all empirical sciences involve claims about particular objects, but I know of nothing he says that has
this consequence for a priori sciences. (Even if he were to hold that all such sciences depend on pure
intuition, §13 of Frege 1884 claims that apparently particular objects yielded by pure intuition “are not
particular at all.”)
39Thanks especially to Joan Weiner for raising this objection.
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constraint on axioms of logic is that they be logical laws. That is why it seems that, be-
fore or after Russell’s Paradox, Frege could have based arithmetic on Hume’s Principle
or a standard set of axioms for arithmetic, rather than Basic Law V. But it was never un-
certainty about whether these other truths are logical that disqualied them from being
axioms.40 There are other constraints: for example, in addition to being logical, axioms
must be “self-evident” and “unprovable” (e.g., Frege 1884, §5). It is a major question just
what these additional constraints amount to, but since Frege accepts such constraints,
my account does not imply that he could have based arithmetic on one of these candi-
dates rather than Basic Law V.41
These constraints make it dicult to actually provide logical foundations for arith-
metic, which is one reason to do it—which brings us to the rst part of the objection. Any
reading of Frege must acknowledge that he takes himself to have powerful reasons to
accept logicism about arithmetic even before he completes the project.42 But no matter
how strong these arguments are, the diculty of providing logical foundations remains
a source of doubt: of concern that the arguments for logicism might contain some kind
40Frege never expresses doubts about the logicality of Hume’s Principle or the Peano Axioms, and he
proves them both from the axioms of logic in Frege 1893. (See Heck 1993 for details.) Whatever the
problem with Hume’s Principle that Frege sees at §§66-67 of Frege 1884, nothing he says suggests that it
is a problem for its logicality.
41As Shapiro 2009 argues, any epistemological view on which we can come to know that something
is true in the way appropriate to axioms by seeing that it plays some kind of systematic role must be
one on which “self-evidence is simply not part of the picture.” Frege’s insistence on self-evidence, then,
ensures that recognizing that a truth has the systematic role appropriate to a logical law provides no
guarantee that the truth can be known in the way axioms must be. Indeed, on plausible interpretations
of what self-evidence amounts to such as that of Jeshion 2001, it proves dicult to nd axioms that meet
the constraint, since “the simplest propositions of arithmetic [including standard sets of axioms] are not
self-evident.” (963)
42Frege oers arguments for logicism—or for the related claim that the foundations of arithmetic can
be neither intuitive nor sensory—at Frege 1874 56-57, Frege 1882 100, various places in Frege 1884, and
Frege 1885a 112-113. Though it is a major question how those arguments are to be understood, he clearly
thinks they establish logicism as the only option: that is why his initial response to Russell’s Paradox is to
claim not only that he no longer sees how to provide a logical foundation for arithmetic, but that without
such a foundation, he no longer sees how “arithmetic can be founded scientically” at all. (See Appendix
2 of Frege 1893.)
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of mistake. Until we nd the foundations, these reasons for doubt render logicism, in
that sense, merely probable.43
This brings us to the third part of the objection. Any reading of Frege’s views on
logicism must acknowledge that once he comes to think the diculties of nding suitable
logical axioms are insurmountable, and to claim that arithmetic is a branch of geometry
rather than logic, he has come to think that his former arguments for logicism must have
contained a mistake after all; most obviously, he must see a aw in his arguments that
arithmetic could not have its source in intuition. He does not say what is wrong with
those earlier arguments, and it is a major question just what he has come to reject. But
there is only a problem for my reading if he continues to think that arithmetical laws
appear in every science. But whatever else he has come to reject, he surely has come to
reject that claim. If space is the form of our sensibility, and the pure intuition of space is
the source of our knowledge of geometry, then a consequence of accepting a geometrical
source for arithmetic is that arithmetical truths will not appear in all scientic systems:
the sciences pursued by beings with dierent forms of sensibility than ours, for example,
will include neither geometry nor arithmetic. This enables him to hold that arithmetic
has geometrical grounds while maintaining the account of logic in terms of systematic
generality.
This objection, then, connects with major questions about Frege’s logicism whose
answers are beyond the scope of this paper—but none of them become especially dicult
to answer once we accept that Frege understood logic the way I suggest. Rather, if
mine is indeed the best reading of Frege’s mature views about logic, we should expect
the connections that we are led to see between Frege’s philosophy of science and his
43Frege himself claims that making it probable is what his arguments accomplish at Frege 1884, §87.
The diculty of nding foundations may not be the only such reason for doubt. Weiner 2010 (35) nds
another in the fact that unlike paradigmatic logical truths, arithmetical truths deal with particular objects.
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philosophy of logic to help us make new progress on those questions.
Second Criterion: Is This a Normative Interpretation?
I noted above that we can put what is special about a law that exhibits systematic gen-
erality this way: it appears in every scientic system. But this claim does not include
any “oughts,” and the second criterion of adequacy was that what is special about the
logical laws must be a normative feature: they and only they prescribe for all judging in
the way he describes. Does this account satisfy that criterion?
It does. The criterion is that the laws of logic must be the only ones that tell us, in
that way, how all our judging ought to be. On my reading, they are: all our judging
ought to be of what only has a place in scientic systems that include the laws of logic,
and that is not true of any other laws. It is not part of the criterion of adequacy that this
be the only thing that is special about them.
One might wonder if there is any reason Frege appeals to the explicitly prescriptive
characterization if equally good descriptive characterizations are available. I think that
there is. In a sense, the prescriptive characterization makes more explicit something
that is contained in the only apparently “descriptive” characterization in terms of sys-
tems. Frege claims that the word “true” belongs with the words “beautiful” and “good”
(e.g., Frege 1918-1919a, 351). He also calls the True and the False truth-values, and not
just because they are the values of certain functions for certain arguments.44 (For one
thing, they are equally the arguments of certain functions that yield certain values, and
he does not call them “truth-arguments.”; for another, everything is the value of cer-
tain functions for certain arguments, and he does not call everything a “-value.”) Such
value-terms, plausibly, are normative in the sense that to understand them is to know
44This functional reading is suggested by Glock 2015.
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something like the standard formula of Frege’s day: that one ought to think the True,
feel the Beautiful, and will the Good.45 If Frege sees talk of truth itself as normative,
then given the connection between scientic systems and truth described in section IV,
it will be the same for systems: one cannot understand talk of scientic systems without
understanding that all judging ought to be of what has a place in such a system.
Objection: A Deeper Account Must Be Available
Someone might admit that Frege thinks that all judging ought to be of what only has a
place in a scientic system including the logical laws, and that this normative feature
is what he has in mind when he calls them “general,” but insist that this cannot be the
whole story: that he could not be satised with this account, because there must be
an explanation of why these laws appear in every science. This explanation, moreover,
must proceed in terms of some more fundamental feature that those laws share—perhaps
a semantic or metaphysical feature—and once this feature is found, it will provide a
deeper characterization of what it is to be a logical law. If so, the normative claim must
be a kind of place-holder, until that deeper characterization can be found.46
To see the aw in this illuminating objection, consider an analogy. Suppose the same
group of philosophers—call them “the Sages”—attended all of the recent great philosophy
conferences, including ones devoted to sub-elds in which the Sages do not specialize.
The Sages thus share a normative feature: they attended every recent great philoso-
phy conference—that is, every one at which a large and intellectually diverse group of
people talk together in ways that lead to the kind of work that philosophers ought to
produce. It is perfectly reasonable to ask for an explanation of why these philosophers
45E.g., Windelband 1883, 328: “thinking has the goal of being True, willing the goal of being Good, and
feeling the goal of grasping the Beautiful.”
46Thanks especially to Richard Heck and John Campbell for raising this worry.
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appeared at every great conference. We may learn that these people do not just show
up at conferences that would anyway be great—rather, each one of them helps to make
philosophy conferences great. Though each Sage does interesting work on some philo-
sophical topic, their primary contribution to great conferences is to facilitate the kind
conversations between other philosophers which lead to the kind of philosophy that
philosophers ought to produce. Such details—all normative ones, to be understood in
terms of the work philosophers ought to produce—explain why the Sages are at every
great conference. At the analogous point, I claim, Frege’s account of logical laws stops:
to be a logical law is to appear in every proper scientic system. These laws appear in
every such system because they serve to connect other truths by proof in ways that yield
such systems: ways that enable the systems to satisfy our cognitive goals. Those who
object that this account of logic would not be deep enough might, then, also object that
there must still be some deeper explanation of being a Sage: some further feature that
the Sages share which explains why they share the normative feature.
But there might really be no such thing. One Sage might have a sharp eye for impli-
cation relations, enabling her to point out when two philosophers’ projects intertwine in
hard-to-spot ways; another might have an exuberant enthusiasm which indirectly helps
other philosophers see what is interesting in each other’s work; a third Sage’s skeptical
disposition might lead complacent philosophers to see that their work could be strength-
ened and seek contact with others for that purpose, and so on. Though each Sage has
some psychological feature that explains how he or she does what he or she does, there
may be no such feature they all have in common which explains why they have the
normative features they share. In that case, there would be no deeper explanation of
what it is to be a Sage. I expect that though Frege would agree that each law has some
non-normative features that explains how it serves to connect the particular truths that
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it does, he would deny that there is a single non-normative feature that all and only the
logical laws share which can explain their having the normative feature they share.
One might try to insist that philosophically or scientically legitimate features and
categories must always be explained or grounded in terms of non-normative ones. But
whether or not such an assumption could be justied, there is not the slightest reason
to attribute it to Frege. Such assumptions were certainly far from common ground in
Frege’s intellectual context: in fact, the most widely read logician of the day claims rather
to be “certain of being on the right track, when I seek in that which should be the ground
of that which is” (Lotze 1879, Volume III, Conclusion).
6 Should We Endorse Frege’s View?
The main task of this paper, to understand the generality that Frege thinks distinguishes
the laws of logic from those of other sciences, is complete. But the views of the norma-
tivity and the nature of logic that I have ascribed to him are largely absent from contem-
porary discussions of these topics.47 Accordingly, readers might be disappointed to learn
that Frege holds them: despite being the founder of modern logic, Frege’s views about
the philosophy of logic might seem unavailable to logicians today as a consequence of
being bound up with outdated views about truth and science.
Before I conclude, then, I will make a preliminary case that Frege’s views should still
be taken seriously today. I will not do so by defending his views of truth and science,
but by showing that we can abstract from the details of those views to arrive at defen-
sible core conceptions of the normativity and the nature of logic. I will begin with the
normative role that Frege claims logical laws play, and then discuss the idea that playing
47See, for example, the absence of anything like Frege’s view from the survey of positions in Steinberger
2016.
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this normative role is the distinctive feature of logical laws.
On the Normativity of Logic
Frege’s interest in scientic truths and scientic systems derives from his conviction that
it is only by having such systems that we understand the world and explain its phenom-
ena: major cognitive goals whose status as such yields prescriptions for our cognitive
activity. His core idea about the normativity of logic is that logical laws play an essen-
tial role whenever we achieve such goals. Leaving aside Frege’s particular conception of
those goals, then, we can identify a broadly Fregean view of the normativity of logic as
one on which the logical laws play an essential role whenever we meet major cognitive
goals which provide prescriptions for our cognitive activity.
So understood, leading contemporary accounts of major cognitive goals at least make
possible, and sometimes imply, a broadly Fregean view of the normativity of logic. To
take one example: a leading general theory of explanation is the “unicationist” theory
defended by Philip Kitcher, according to which an explanation is an argument that is
an instance of one of the few “argument patterns” that best “systematize” the “set of
statements endorsed by the scientic community.” Kitcher further endorses the “deduc-
tive chauvinist” view that the only explanatory argument-patterns are deductively valid
(Kitcher 1989; see also Friedman 1974). This yields an essential role for logical laws in
all explanations—reaching this cognitive goal in every case depends on the logical laws.
Assuming that this cognitive goal yields prescriptions for our cognitive activity, Kitcher
is committed to a broadly Fregean view of the normativity of logic.48
48To take another example: though there is much disagreement in the expanding literature on under-
standing, “if there is a common idea here it seems to be that understanding is directed at a complex...with
parts or elements that depend upon, and relate to, one another.” (Grimm 2012, 105. See, for example,
Zagzebski 2001, Kvanvig 2003, Elgin 2006, and Pritchard 2009.) These dependencies and relationships
paradigmatically include logical relations—for example, according to Kvanvig 2003, “understanding re-
quires...an internal grasping or appreciation of how the various elements in a body of information are
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On The Nature of Logic
A broadly Fregean view of the normativity of logic makes space for a broadly Fregean
view of the nature of logic, on which what is distinctive of logical laws is their having the
normative role just described. Whether or not that is a good account depends on why it
matters which laws count as logical in the rst place. I focus here on two reasons, which
we can call “looking after the future” and “looking after the past.”49
Consider a 20th-century analytic philosopher who announces that what is distinctive
of philosophical truths is that they are true in virtue of the meanings of the words in-
volved, so that the proper method for philosophy is linguistic analysis. This pronounce-
ment might be revolutionary in spirit: regardless of what those called “philosophers”
have hitherto been doing, its point is to orient our future investigations toward impor-
tant truths that can be productively investigated. An account of the nature of logical
laws that looks after the future would, in this way, identify a group of laws that are im-
portant and can be productively investigated. Like this analytic philosopher, when we
look after the future of logic, we must in principle be prepared for revolution: we may
need to deny that the questions and methods of those hitherto called “logicians” have
anything to do with what logic really is.
But as Hartry Field has recently emphasized, we also want an account of logic to
tell us “what people who disagree in logic are disagreeing about” (Field 2015, 35). More
generally, an account of logic that looks after the past lets us see similarities and dif-
related to each other in terms of explanatory, logical, probabilistic, and other kinds of relations.” (192-
193.) If logical relations prove to be required in every case, this implies a broadly Fregean view of the
normativity of logic.
49Neither of these desiderata involve satisfying “pre-theoretical intuitions” about logicality. This goal
of philosophy is unavailable, because there do not seem to be any pre-theoretical intuitions about this.
As MacFarlane puts it, “Students beginning an introductory logic class typically have inferential intu-
itions, but they can be brought to distinguish logically valid inferences from materially valid ones only by
instruction. All of our intuitions about logicality bear the stamp of theory.” MacFarlane 2000, section 1.4.
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ferences among what prominent thinkers have said about logic as (not merely verbal
but) genuine agreements and disagreements about some topic, pursued in reasonable
ways. For example: if Kant denies that arithmetical laws are logical, and Frege holds
that they are logical, we want an account of what logic is to let us see this as a disagree-
ment about something, in which Frege and Kant say things in support of their views
that are (at least plausibly) genuine reasons that count in favour of those views. When
we look after logic’s past, we must in principle be prepared to study what is merely a
historical curiosity: a faithful account of what people have been arguing about under
the name “logic” may require us to recognize that they were not arguing about anything
that matters very much.
Ideally, we would not have to choose: our account of the nature of logic would let
us see prominent thinkers as having reasonable agreements and disagreements (looking
after the past) about genuinely important issues that can be productively investigated
(looking after the future). By this standard, the broadly Fregean account of the nature
of logic looks promising. It looks after the future because, as discussed above, cognitive
goals whose achievement always involves a certain a set of laws remain a major focus of
productive work in philosophy. Showing that it looks after the past is a major historical
task, but let me give a sketch of the kind of interesting disagreements that a broadly
Fregean view of the nature of logic enables us to see between Frege and three other
important gures: Aristotle, Kant, and Carnap.
• Frege and Aristotle: One dierence between Frege’s logic and the syllogistic
logic of the Analytics is that the latter does not allow for proofs involving multiple
generality: from the premise that there is somebody whom everyone loves, we
cannot prove that everybody loves at least one person. On the broadly Fregean
view, this is a failing of Aristotle’s logic only if such proofs are needed whenever
we reach the relevant cognitive goals. Frege would argue that there are scienti-
cally relevant proofs involving multiple generality—including those involving the
continuity of a function and the notion of following in a series—and that some
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such proofs are needed every time we achieve our cognitive goals, because scien-
tic arithmetic requires such proofs and is required in every scientic system.
• Frege and Kant: On the broadly Fregean view, to deny that arithmetical laws
are logical is to deny that they are always required to reach our central cognitive
goals. It might seem that there is no disagreement between Frege and Kant here,
since Kant, too, identies “proper science” as the way to achieve those goals, and
claims that “a doctrine of nature will contain only as much proper science as there
is mathematics capable of application there” (Kant 1786, Introduction). The dis-
agreement is found in Kant’s saying “mathematics” rather than “arithmetic.” Kant
argues that proper science must include some mathematics,50 but denies that it al-
ways requires arithmetic, because all creatures who share our faculties of reason
and the understanding share our cognitive goals, but not all such creatures share
the form of sensibility upon which arithmetic depends. Frege would argue that
arithmetic does not depend on the form of our sensibility.51
• Frege and Carnap: Carnap is famous for his “principle of tolerance,” according to
which we are free to choose one or another logical system as a matter of “conven-
tion,” based on the way we respond to “pragmatic” considerations like “eciency,
fruitfulness, and simplicity”; our choice is not constrained by “the striving after
‘correctness’ ” (Carnap 1950, Foreword and section 2). On the broadly Fregean
view, this is logical nihilism, as Carnap probably recognizes: while Frege had iden-
tied logic as the “ethics of thought,” Carnap announces that “in logic, there are
no morals” (Carnap 1937, §17). The substantive issue is whether or not there is a
single set of laws that is in every case needed to reach the relevant cognitive goals.
Frege would argue that many considerations Carnap calls “pragmatic” are actually
aspects of the goals themselves. For example, Frege sees some of them as part of
a kind of simplicity which it is “a basic principle of science” to achieve, and whose
achievement is part of “the ideal of a strictly scientic method.” (See Frege 1914,
242; Frege 1880-1881, 36; and Frege 1893, Introduction).52 (Later, Quine would ar-
50Kant’s argument is that any science needs to have an a priori part “lying at the basis of the empirical
part,” but to cognize determinate natural things a priori requires “that [an] intuition...be given a priori,”
and any knowledge based in this way on “the presentation of the object in a priori intuition, is called
mathematics.”
51Of the many things Kant calls “logic,” the broadly Fregean view implies that we should compare
Frege’s logic not only with “pure general” logic (which has no content at all) but with aspects of “tran-
scendental” logic, which presupposes that the conditions on having the content appropriate for science
are met in one way or another without assuming that they have been met by sensibility: what we study
“distinguishes itself not merely from all that is empirical but completely also from all sensibility.” (Kant
1781/1787, A65/B90.) MacFarlane 2002 argues that disputes between Frege and Kant must be about what
Kant calls “pure general logic,” since he thinks only this has the general normative role, but I think that
transcendental logic is not a special logic, and that the dierence between transcendental logic and pure
general logic is one of aspect, not normative generality. (See Tolley 2012.)
52The central aspect of simplicity has to do with the number of primitive truths: As Frege 1914 puts it,
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gue in a similar vein that Carnap’s apparently “pragmatic” considerations are ac-
tually part of the scientic goal itself: “What seemed to smack of convention....was
‘deliberate choice, set forth unaccompanied by any attempt at justication other
than in terms of elegance and convenience’...[but] surely the justication of any
theoretical hypothesis can...consist in no more than the elegance or convenience
which the hypothesis brings” (Quine 1960, section VI).
7 Conclusion
I hope to have made a start toward showing the promise of a broadly Fregean view of the
normativity and nature of logic. But more centrally, I hope to have shown that Frege, at
least, understands the nature of logic in connection with the ambitious cognitive goals
that we achieve through discovering scientic systems: they are the laws that we depend
on whenever we achieve those goals. The key to understanding Frege’s claims is to recall
that that the only “sort of truth” that he ever writes about is to be understood in terms
of those same goals. This enables us to understand Frege’s claim that it is distinctive of
the laws of logic that they prescribe for all thinking.53
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